University of Miami Law School

University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles

Faculty and Deans

1997

The Association of American Law Schools, Section
on Mass Communications Law 1997 Annual
Conference Panel: Sex, Violence, Children & the
Media: Legal, Historical &empirical Perspectives
Lili Levi
University of Miami School of Law, llevi@law.miami.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
Lili Levi, The Association of American Law Schools, Section on Mass Communications Law 1997 Annual Conference Panel: Sex, Violence,
Children & the Media: Legal, Historical &empirical Perspectives, 5 CommLaw Conspectus 341 (1997).

This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository.
For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAw SCHOOLS, SECTION
ON MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1997 ANNUAL
CONFERENCE PANEL: SEX, VIOLENCE, CHILDREN & TILE
MEDL4: LEGAL, HIsToRIcAL &EMPIRJcAL PERSPECTIFES*
The regulation of electronic mass communication has
been increasingly justified by reference to the welfare
of children. One side of the coin is the protection of
children from harm. Thus, indecency on the airwaves
is to be channeled to late night hours, television sets
are to be manufactured with V-chips, and ratings are to
be developed to aid parents in blocking access to overly
violent programming. The other side of the coin is the
affirmative goal of using the mass media to educate
children. Thus, broadcasters are to provide a threehour per week minimum of children's educational programming as part of their license renewal obligations.
The program was designed to situate both sorts of
child-welfare-based arguments in their policy contexts
and in constitutional, empirical and socio-historical
perspective. Christopher Wright, Deputy General
Counsel of the Federal Communications Commission,
addressed the justifications of the FCC's new spin on
broadcasters' public interest obligations. Professor
Dale Kunkel of the Department of Communications at
the University of California, Santa Barbara commented
on the social science data about media effects on children, including the results of recent research on violence. Professor Catherine Ross of the George Washington University Law School described the history of
the idea of the child, the ways in which the rhetoric of
child welfare has been deployed historically in media
reform efforts, and the particular First Amendment
dangers of governmental interventions today. Professor Jack Balkin of Yale Law School discussed the constitutional issues posed by attempts to reduce television
violence and indecency, and the unintended cultural
consequences of technological innovation. Professor
Lili Levi of the University of Miami School of Law, moderator of the panel, used the lens of the FCC's approach to child-based regulation to characterize the
agency's emerging administrative model.

the welfare of children. In memory of Thomas
Kuhn, then, let us say that there appears to have
been a paradigm shift in regulatory justification from Red Lion to Pacifica. And that is terribly interesting.
We see the child-centered regulatory policies
both at the congressional level and at the FCC.
For example, Congress includes the V-chip in the
otherwise structurally deregulatory Telecommunications Act of 1996. Similarly, Reed Hundt, the
FCC Chairman, begins to talk about a revived
public interest obligation that is grounded in part
on the protection of children and in part on the
enhancement of citizenly values. Courts, too,
quickly accede to claims of compelling state interests in children: both in the protection of children and in parental control over children's access to broadcast material. In fact, they often do
so without recognition of the potential tension between those two interests.
At the FCC level, this approach has led to the
development of two regulatory models in the children context. One is an "affirmative" model, pursuant to which affirmative obligations are imposed on broadcasters. The Commission's recent
adoption of a three-hour per week minimum requirement for children's educational programming for painless renewal is an example of such
an affirmative approach. The second model
emerging at the FCC is a "programming constraints" model. For example, the prohibition of
broadcast indecency during daytime hours constrains broadcaster behavior. (The same might be
said in the future in connection with the Commission's potential role in the implementation of Vchip ratings.)
The rhetoric of child welfare is thus a powerful
force in the regulatory arena today. What this
means is that we have a hot topic very much in the
public eye. While much addressed, it has been

Lili Levi:
Welcome to Sex, Violence, Children and the Media:
Legal, Historicaland EmpiricalPerspectives. I am Lili
Levi from the University of Miami, Chair of this
Section for another two hours. I wanted to sketch
out for you "why this topic, why this panel" before
we delve into it. The traditional rationale for
broadcast regulation has been the scarcity of
broadcast frequencies. Now, however, the most
popular justification for broadcast regulation is

publication.

* The following was recorded live on January 7, 1997 in
Washington, D.C. It has been edited for purposes of
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nevertheless underanalyzed. That was the reason
for this particular panel.
Out topic raises a number of issues. Assuming
that there is a consensus about the desire to protect children, what do we do? Where does this
lead us in terms of regulatory actions? For example, what do we characterize as harm? "Compared to what," as Eddie Harris might ask. How
do we assess harm? Who is in our protected category - how do we define children? What does it
mean to include in the set of "children" both twoyear-olds and seventeen year olds? Should sex
and violence be in the same regulatory boat?
How should we assess the regulatory moves that
already have been made in the name of child-protection? Can we discern any seeds of a particular
ideology - in the style of regulation, in the selection of regulatory methods, or in implementation? What are the social as well as doctrinal, cultural as well as legal, settings and consequences of
particular types of regulatory regimes and particular types of regulatory rationales.
In light of those questions, I would like to introduce the panelists. We are honored this morning
to have with us Christopher Wright, who is the
Deputy General Counsel of the FCC and has
worked with Chairman Hundt in articulating the
vision of the Hundt FCC. Then we will hear from
Professor Dale Kunkel of the Communications
Department at the University of California, Santa
Barbara. Professor Kunkel has been very active in
the National Television Violence study about
which you have all been reading for the past year.
He is also currently at the center of the debate on
the issue of what type of rating system we should
deploy in connection with the V-chip. Following
Professor Kunkel will be Professor Catherine Ross
of the George Washington Law School and Professor Jack Balkin of the Yale Law School, neither
one of whom needs any additional introduction
to this group. So, without further ado, I want to
thank Mr. Wright and turn over the microphone.
Chris Wright:
Thanks, Lili. You're right, we think there is a
difference between "positive" and "negative" regulation of the mass media, and particularly with respect to children. Let me try to report to this
group how we think about those issues and what I
1 47 U.S.C.

§ 303b(a) (1994).
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think the key cases are. I would be interested very
much in learning from you.
When you work for a federal agency, most of
your problems come to you. Academics have the
luxury of studying what you like. But, to some extent we are necessarily reactive. Let me start with
one of our reactions on the "positive" side first.
One of the things we had to react to was the implementation of the Children's Television Act of
1990. What that Act says is that, during the license renewal process for television stations, "the
Commission shall .. . consider the extent to which
the licensee .

.

. has served the educational and

informational needs of children."' The Act was
passed by a Democratic Congress in 1990 that was
very frustrated with the fact that the FCC, then
chaired by a Republican, was not requiring anything at all from television stations with respect to
children's programming. The Act was an order to
do something - something specific - during li-

cense renewals: to "consider the extent to which
the licensee .

.

. has served the educational and

informational needs of children." Beyond that,
the statute does not tell you very much.
What we found - almost five years after the passage of the Children's Television Act as we were
going into a new round of license renewals - was
that all television licenses were being renewed
and that the staff was using an unpublished guideline of half an hour per week of children's educational programming. That is, if a broadcaster was
doing something it claimed to be educational for
half an hour a week, it was getting passed and its
license was getting renewed. Moreover, what was
being claimed as educational included programs
that hardly seem educational. Dale Kunkel provided us with a lot of this information, and he is
better able to I to report his findings, but, for instance, some broadcasters claimed that the Power
Rangers is an educational program. Some broadcasters weren't doing even a half an a hour a week
of anything that anybody could say, with a straight
face, was educational. The staff was actually calling those stations and getting them to promise
that they would do a half hour of educational programming in the future.
That simply is not an acceptable implementation of the Children's Television Act. Whatever is
was Congress meant it was hard to believe that
that's what it meant. However, if you are going to
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sanction or consider not renewing the license of a
broadcaster, what do you do against this background? Of course, the FCC has to be consistent
and when you have been renewing licenses, without sanction, where stations are doing half an
hour a week, you can't then all of a sudden start
not renewing the licenses of stations that are doing the same thing. So we had a very controversial
rulemaking proceeding that culminated in the
three hour a week rule that Lili referred to. It was
completed last summer. There were only four
commissioners at the time and it's certainly public
knowledge that they were bitterly and equally divided on many of the issues facing them - but we
nevertheless ended up with a three hour a week
processing guideline. The guideline provides that
if a broadcaster does three hours a week of something that is educational and aimed at children,
then no further analysis will be done to see if the
broadcaster is complying the Children's Television Act. If a broadcaster has done less than three
hours a week, a closer look will be taken and perhaps the licensee will persuade the Commission
that it has taken other steps that ought to persuade the Commission to overlook the failure to
provide three hours a week of educational programming.
In my view, in defending the guideline the most
applicable precedent is the too-often-overlooked
1981 CBS case. 2 As you may or may not remember, by a six to three vote the Supreme Court in
that case upheld the only other specific positive
obligation placed on broadcasters: the obligation
to sell time to political candidates at the lowest
unit charge. In CBS, the Court stressed that
broadcasters are "granted the free and exclusive
use of a limited and valuable part of the public
domain," and concluded that when they accept
"that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations."3 Now, there is obviously some of
Red Lion in there, but I think what is actually more
important is that the broadcast spectrum has always been viewed as and is public property. I
would think, for instance, that if we turned over
our building at 1919 M Street to broadcasters and
didn't charge them rent and didn't ask them to
make any sort of "in kind" payment in return for
using our building, there would be a scandal. You
just can't do that - right? In fact, there are rules
2

s

CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
Id. at 394.
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against giving away public property. However, to
some extent that's what we've been doing for sixty
years in broadcast area. But I think it is important
to remind everyone that broadcast licensing has
always been viewed as an "in kind" transfer. The
broadcasters have always been given their licenses
for free on the theory that they are public trustees.
Let me tell you an anecdote. The offices of the
National Association of Broadcasters are only a
few blocks from our office, and in the Summer of
1994 the hot thing going on at the Commission
was the auction of the licenses to provide personal
communications services. We were holding the
world's first auction of spectrum licenses and we
have now raised more than $20 billion on these
auctions. I was walking out to lunch one day in
the Summer of 1994 and saw one of the lawyers
from NAB, who just happened to be walking by
our building, and I said, "Can broadcast licenses
be far behind?" The NAB lawyer knew exactly
what I was talking about, and said, "No, no, no,
no, no - broadcasters are public trustees. We're
given the free use of the spectrum because we
serve the public interest." I reminded him of that
during the debate about the Children's Television
Act in which the NAB's initial position was not
favorable to the three hour guideline. As it happened, NAB came around and there was agreement on the three hour processing guideline that
was ultimately adopted and there was no litigation. I sort of felt bad about that, as a litigator,
since I would have handled it, but [laughter from
the crowd] but I assume that we will have some
litigation down the line. Somewhere, sometime,
perhaps soon, some broadcaster is not going to
do three hours of something that is educational
and will not perform some reasonably comparable services. The Commission will presumably do
something other than unconditionally grant renewal of the broadcaster's license and we will
then be smack in the middle of a debate first
about what standard of review ought to apply and
then how it ought to be applied. And as I say, if I
am handling it at the time, I intend to use CBS as
my leading precedent.
We managed to get a little mileage out of auctions from the D.C. Circuit last summer in the
DBS case. 4 I am not sure you are aware of the stat4 Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
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ute governing direct broadcast satellite licenses
says that, in return for one of those licenses, 4 to
7% of the channels have to be set aside for noncommercial educational programming.5 That
provisions was challenged by Time Warner in the
DBS case, which we called "the kitchen sink" case
because Time Warner just went through the 1992
Cable Act and claimed that virtually every provision was unconstitutional. We won in the D.C.
Circuit last August on all issues, and the panel
mentioned prominently in the DBS set-aside portion its decision that, although we gave the first
DBS licenses away for free under the old regime,
we are now auctioning them. It noted that MCI
had paid six hundred eight-two and a half million
dollars for a recent DBS license. MCI presumably
discounted its bid to take account of the fact that
it was going to have to set aside four to seven percent of its channels for non-educational programming. These auctions point up the fact that there
really is an "in kind" trade going on, and, if the 4
to 7% set aside isn't permissible, at the least there
ought to be a re-auction, one would think, so the
government can obtain the full value of the spectrum "in cash" rather than partly "in cash" and
partly "in kind."
But getting back to television licenses, the Commission does not have authority to auction broadcast licenses right now and, as many of you probably know, a big issue that will get resolved in
stages over the next couple of years is what to do
with the new digital television licenses. What the
broadcasters would like is for each existing broadcaster to get a new digital license for free that
would allow them to carry four or five channels of
broadcasting or do high definition TV or do a
couple of channels of broadcasting and do other
services like perhaps cellular service, and without
any concrete public interest requirements attached.
It is not entirely clear exactly how the public
will be guaranteed some return on the lease of
public spectrum. The cleanest solution, from a
constitutional point of view, would simply auction
these licenses, put the proceeds in a trust fund,
and use the interest to do all the sorts of things on
the "positive" side that Congress would like to do.
It is interesting, by the way, when you start to look
at the numbers, that you could triple the budget
of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, fund
5

47 U.S.C. § 335(b) (1) (1994).

[VoL 5

the FCC, give money to political candidates equal
to twice what they currently spend, and still have a
lot of money left over. And that is based on a conservative estimate of the value of the spectrum.
However, that doesn't seem to be in the works
and I think, therefore, that we will proceed on the
current path which is, as I have said, basically an
"in kind trade" model. The broadcasters will get
the spectrum, but they will be required to serve as
public trustees in response, and we at the FCC will
have the job of trying to make sure that the public
gets something out of this deal. I would hope that
making the broadcasters' promises as concrete as
possible before the digital licenses are issued
would be a big step toward achieving that goal.
In that connection, one of my other favorite
analogies is to broadcast and cable. The broadcasters constantly complain that they're treated as
a second class citizens. In fact, that is not true at
all. Cable operators have to string their wires
across public rights of way and have to get permission to do that on an exclusive basis. The norm in
this country is that cable operators pay a licensing
fee of 5% of their gross revenues. Federal law actually capped it at 5%.6 If the localities could
charge whatever they wanted, they would get
more. And in addition, cable operators commonly set aside "PEG" channels - Public, Educational and Governmental channels - that they
more or less turn over to the local franchising authority. The net result of the license fee and the
PEG channels - which are "in kind" payments - is

that typical cable operator pays eight to nine percent of its gross revenues to the locality either in
cash or in kind. That is a pretty significant
amount that, frankly, dwarfs the rather minor burdens placed on broadcasters. Anyway, that is one
of my favorite analogies and I hope to continue to
bring that up.
One other point I would like to make to this
group is that one of the most interesting decisions
that was made in this area was made in 1952 in
the original decision issued by the FCC that essentially fixed the TV station allotments as we have
them now. Part of that decision was that 25% of
the channels were reserved for noncommercial
educational use and now is the PBS system. I
think it is interesting that nobody ever challenged
that or ever thought that was a questionable sort
of thing for the government to do. Obviously,
6

47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1994).
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everything we do in this area is challenged vigorously today.
But it seems clear that we could do some other
things comparable to the 1952 set-aside. For example, there is no reason that a broadcast license
has to be for 24-hours a day. We could reserve
25% of that for PEG type purposes for the government to program as it chooses. I think, as you
probably do, that we are better off with the current system. We are better off letting the licensees
provide educational programming or other forms
of public services themselves. They certainly prefer that. But it is odd how some of these alternatives, which are more burdensome from the
broadcasters' perspective, would probably be easier to defend.
Let me take one minute to discuss sex and violence, because I know others will have a lot to say
about that. That's the "negative" side of broadcast regulation. We won a case in the D.C. Circuit
in 1995 before the en bariccourt called the ACT III
case.7 It was my first step into sex and violence.
We won seven to four in the D.C. Circuit. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, so that case is
over. As you probably know, we ended up there
with a 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. restriction on indecency,
or a 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. safe harbor, depending on
how you want to look at it. The court applied
strict scrutiny and we prevailed under its application of that standard. In my view, the leading case
in this area is Ginsberg v. New York," the decision
from 1968 involving the sale of Sir magazine,
which was a competitor to Playboy. That is, it was
indecent, but obviously could not be considered
obscene under any standard. And basically, the
rule from that case, which remains the rule today
with respect to magazines, is that you can sell
whatever you want to adults, but you can't sell
whatever you want to people under a certain age.
That case, I believe, involved a 16-year-old. The
problem in broadcasting is that you don't have
someone at the point of sale to check viewers'
age. You don't have the sales clerk to control the
sale. Again, the broadcasters like to say that they
are treated so much worse than everyone else.
But I don't think you could sell Sir magazine in a
vending machine out on the street. And I don't
think you could put pictures from Sir on a billboard on Connecticut Avenue either. It seems to
7 Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
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me that you can take some reasonable steps with
respect to children.
Violence - when I first started thinking about
television violence, I had the ACT III model in
mind and my first take on it was that the main
difference between violence and indecency is that
there was a whole log more scholarly literature
showing that there is a real danger from children
watching violence than indecency, and therefore
a safe harbor of the sort that got approved in the
ACT III case ought to work for violence as well.
And Senator Hollings has been supporting a time
channeling bill for violence for a long time. Of
course, what we have ended up instead with the Vchip.
Let me just close my brief comments by saying
if we get around to litigating that, I think the most
useful case will be Meese v. Keene.9 That is the case
from about ten years ago involving the requirement that films produced by foreign government
have labels on them identifying them as "propaganda." That requirement was approved by the
Supreme Court, and in its opinion the Court said
a lot of nice things about labels. And if a rating
system can be viewed as a label - which it plainly
can and should - that seems to be the way it ought
to be defended. Well, let me give everyone else a
shot.
Dale Kunkel:
Good morning. I don't know many of you here
and that is because I come from a different background, not a legal background. You've just had
Chris give you a solid dose of legal perspectives on
these topics. I am going to try to give you a small
dose of historical and probably a heavy dose of
empirical perspectives on the topic of children
and media policy. My background is as a psychologist and someone who studies how children
make sense of television; that is, how children of
different ages understand messages in television
content and then how they are influenced by that
message.
I have suggested that there are three primary
types of policy concerns that encompass the whole
realm of children and media policy. The first
deals with the adequacy of television's service to
the child audience. Children of different ages un8 390 U.S. 629 (1968).

9 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
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derstand the world differently, but we have, as
Chris underscores, one medium reaching all children. Imagine that you are an elementary school
instructor. Could you envision using one book to
teach children of all ages to read? Of course not.
Children of different ages have differing capabilities. What is simple to a 10-year-old may be challenging to a child aged eight and incomprehensible to one aged six. Unlike print media, however,
television rarely addresses its content to any subset of the overall child audience. And so when
you ask is television adequately serving the needs
of children, you can't think of children as just a
uni-dimensional construct. We have children of
different ages who have different needs. And so
the proper question is: is television serving the
needs of children of all particular age ranges?
The Children's Television Act speaks to this issue by saying broadcasters must provide content
specifically designed to serve the needs of children. It doesn't say it has to be age specific, but it
says it has to be "specifically designed." I have
pleaded to the Commission that content cannot
be specifically designed for children if it doesn't
take into account the age of the intended audience that it's targeting, and the related learning
needs and capabilities of that audience. But I am
not going to focus on this first type of issue today.
The second of the basic concerns in the realm
of children and media policy is the question of
the fairness of advertising to children; in particular to children who we know from psychological
research are too young to recognize and defend
effectively against commercial persuasion. Here
there are two fundamental types of evidence that
are relevant: one that looks at the age at which
young children first develop the skill to discriminate at a perceptual level television programming
from advertising. To a very young child, television
is initially a stream of messages on a screen.
There are no categories used to differentiate
these messages in any way.
Children first develop the ability to discriminate programs from commercials at a fairly young
age - about four to five, depending on the individual. But that is only a necessary, though not
sufficient, skill to "defend" against televised commercial persuasion. The more important cognitive capability here is the ability to recognize the
persuasive intent that necessarily underlies all television advertising. Here, advertisers often assert

[Vol. 5

that children at about age five or six can recognize that an ad wants you to buy the product.
You're a parent and you ask your child what that
ad wants you to do. The child may be able to say
"that ad wants me to buy something." Yet there is
more to understanding persuasive intent and defending against it than this simple understanding.
To have mature understanding of television advertising as a persuasive tool, one must understand that there is a source of the ad, that the
source has interests that are different than the receiver, that the ad therefore is necessarily biased
(e.g., will present the product in ways that are
only favorable to the source's perspective), and
that messages that are biased demand different interpretive strategies than unbiased messages.
Children generally don't develop this level of
comprehension until about age seven or eight.
That is the point in time - the youngest point in
time - when most psychologists would say that it
would be fair to target young children with television advertising. But I am not going to talk about
that today, either. [laughter from audience]
The third key type of issue and the one that I
want to focus my remarks on deals with the adverse effects of program portrayals. I'll choose my
terminology carefully here, but what we are talking about is harm. These terms such as "adverse"
or "harmful" necessarily involve value-oriented
perspectives. But there is a societal consensus
that promoting violence and aggression is harmful. It is not scientists playing social engineers saying here's how we define harm; rather researchers
clearly specify what types of effects can be identified in children who are exposed to certain types
of material, and then the societal consensus
comes into play in terms of the value filter about
the implications of those outcomes.
The adverse affects of program portrayals are
largely considered unintended effects of television content. And, I certainly think that is the
case. I don't believe that Dick Wolf, producer of a
great deal of violent programming on television,
really intends to change children's attitudes and
behaviors in a more anti-social or violent way.
But, nonetheless, in making his programs that
have a typically violent theme, that is the outcome
when children view them, as we will see in a moment. This third area also encompasses indecency regulation as well as other realms that
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would - depending on one's value perspectives -

generate adverse effects from program portrayals.
Let's start with a little bit of a historical perspective on TV violence. If you go back to the earliest
days of television in the 1950s, the Senate Committee on Juvenile Delinquency held the first
Congressional hearing in 1954 and immediately
drew the conclusion that television violence was
contributing to violence and aggression in society
despite the virtual absence of any scientific or empirical evidence on the topic. That didn't necessarily get things off on the right foot in terms of
the linkage between research and policy. It did,
however, serve as a catalyst to get researchers to
investigate. Psychologists began to research this
topic very actively later in the 1950s, so that by the
1960s we began to see the emergence of some
solid evidence. This work implicated television violence in terms of influencing young children's
attitudes towards aggressive behavior as well as increasing their likelihood of behaving aggressively
after viewing televised violence.
Interestingly, while this information was developing in the 1960s, not all studies generated the
same findings. In general, researchers only draw
conclusions across studies, at least conclusions of
any substance or consequence. We might say that
one study generates this or that finding, but that
is with one sample and one stimulus program and
so forth, but we only draw solid conclusions across
studies. And as the evidence was mounting up on
TV violence effects, and looking collectively at the
accumulated body of research, it was often the
case that some studies didn't discover the effects
that other studies did in terms of a child viewing
an aggressive program and them responding in a
more aggressive fashion. This puzzle wasn't really
unraveled at the time, although we know today,
with another twenty-five years of accumulated research evidence, that one reason all the studies
didn't generate the same sort of uniform findings
is that violence is not a uni-dimensional construct.
That is, all types of violent portrayals are not necessarily the same.
There are many different ways in which one can
depict an act of violence. It can be presented explicitly or implicitly. Violence can be shown at a
distance or close up with graphic displays of harm
or blood and gore and so forth. It can depict negative consequences for the perpetrator of the violence. It can depict the violence as being success-
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ful and rewarding or rejected and punished. Few
of these factors were being examined back in the
early research. Yet as it turns out, some types of
violent portrayals pose more risk than others for
harmful impact on the audience. It took some
time for the scientific community to develop our
thinking and our theorizing about the various
types of depictions. But, that was coming together by, I would say, certainly the 1980s.
In the 1970s, there was a very important development from a policy perspective in this realm of
TV violence that is almost lost history today. The
U.S. Surgeon General had been commissioned by
Congress to "answer once and for all" the issue of
whether TV violence contributed to children's aggressive behavior. The Surgeon General's conclusion was modestly equivocal. It indicated that
some violent depictions influence some children
to behave more aggressively. Not all violent depictions cause the effect and not all children will
be affected. The story of this report was broken
first by The New York Times, which had obtained
a leaked copy. The story was written by the television beat reporter, not a psychologist or a scientist, and released a day before the Surgeon General's press conference. Because of the complex
language in the report, the story was entirely misunderstood and headlined as "television absolved
of culpability for increasing child aggression." In
my estimation that probably set back public understanding in this area about ten years. The
press reaction pretty much followed the pattern
set by that story for many years.
By the 1980s, the public's understanding about
TV violence began to improve because you had
virtually every major scientific organization drawing the same conclusion: most depictions of television violence contribute to aggressive attitudes
and behavior in child viewers. Organizations including the American Psychological Association,
American Medical Association, National Academy
of Sciences, National Institute of Mental Health,
all issued the same finding. Finally, that information penetrated the public consciousness and so
by the start of the 1990s you had a situation where
80% or more of the American public believed
that television violence contributes to aggressive
behavior in child viewers. While it is essential to
have the scientific base to pursue policies in this
realm, it is critical from a political perspective, to
have the public understanding and support to
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pursue any policies in this area. By the 1990s both
of these elements came together and that is why
you see the movement that we have today to address the problems of TV violence.
The television industry responded to the strong
concern in the early '90s about TV violence by acting on a plea from Senator Paul Simon, who had
asked the industry to hire independent outside
monitors to review the way in which violence was
presented on television; in essence, to give the industry a report card and hold them accountable
for their public commitments to reduce harmful
depictions of violence. Two studies were commissioned in 1994, one funded by the broadcast industry, and a separate study funded by the cable
industry. I am involved with the cable industry
funded study, called the National Television Violence Study. NTVS involves leading researchers at
four major universities. My team at the University
of California, Santa Barbara examines the content
of most all programming on television, including
both broadcast and cable. I'd like now to give you
a brief overview of some of the key findings from
the study.10 My goal here is to give you a flavor
for the type of work we are doing, and to underscore how the approach of this particular study
emphasizes the premise that not all violence is the
same - that some depictions of violence pose
greater risks than others for child viewers. The
goal of this research is to identify the depictions
that pose the greatest risk, to identify where they
are located, and who is presenting them and how
often.
There are three levels of analysis at which we
examine the content: (1) the overall program
level where our coders make judgments about a
theme or message that would have been present
or absent at the level of the entire program; (2)
scene level measures - I'm sure you understand
generally what a scene refers to; and then (3) interaction level measures. An interaction is the
most micro-level of our content measures. It is an
exchange of violent behavior typically involving
two or more people within a scene. So that if I hit
this gentleman in the front row, I am now a Perpetrator. I have engaged in an Act of violence by
hitting him. He is a Target. Thus, we have a PAT
(perpetrator-act-target) interaction. Next we
classify important contextual features that are related to that PAT. We look at issues such as: was
10

See Appendix I.
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the violence successful; was it rewarded; was itjustified; and elements that are important in terms
of understanding its likely effects.
Here's a summary of some of the key findings
at, first, the program level. The first statistic at
the very top of this figure is the least informative,
nonetheless it is the one that gets the most attention in the press. It tells what proportion of programs contain any violence: 57% in 1994-95. Of
that 57% if you go down to the middle of the table you see that only 4% have an overall anti-violence theme. An anti-violence theme is a program that underscores the pain and suffering of
victims, that emphasizes alternatives to violence,
and so forth. I just don't have the time right now
to go into detail on some of these measures,
although all of the intricacies are included in the
full report. My point here is that you shouldn't
necessarily assume that all violence is problematic
violence. Nonetheless, we start at the level of
identifying all violent acts and we see that over
half of all programs on television contain some violence.
Next, you see that nine or more violent interactions appear in 33% of all violent programs. In
other words, we see that one-third of all the violent programs have a relatively high amount of violence. Still, that doesn't tell us about the context.
The more important factors are near the bottom of the table where it reports the pattern for
depicting long-term negative consequences. Only
16% of the programs portray long-term negative
consequences of violence. That would include
the psychological harm of losing a loved one who
was killed as a victim of violence, the economic
hardships that might accompany a widow, the
physical hardships of a victim crippled by violence. While there are many different ways of depicting long-term negative consequences, programs typically present few of them.
Next consider the contextual measures at the
scene and interaction level. You see that at the
scene level, nearly three out of four depictions of
violence contain no punishment for perpetrators.
This statistic was attacked by the Hollywood creative community. They said "You guys are supposed to be the watch dogs, and you're telling us
that we're bad because three out of four times we
write scenes that don't contain punishment for
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the violence within that same scene." (In fact, the
measure considers the subsequent scene as well,
but essentially it's a fair allegation.) They say,
"How could I possibly write a good story that
would have someone committing a violent act and
being punished within the same scene? There is
no suspense. There is no drama. That's silly. No
one could do that." My response is - you're absolutely right - if your concern is solely with audiences of adults.
This statistic is not meant to be prescriptive information that should be applied to all situations.
It's descriptive and has a particular purpose. This
statistic is particularly meaningful for understanding how children will comprehend and be affected by portrayals of violence. Young children
below the age of about seven to eight do not do a
good job of linking cause and effect between
scenes that occur early in a program and scenes
that occur late in a program. A young child
viewer who sees an act of violence early in a program and then sees it punished with the perpetrator being taken to jail later in the program will
typically see these actions as discrete, unrelated
events and the initial violent act, therefore, will be
understood by a child viewer as violence that went
unpunished. If you know the psychological literature, you know that violence that is unpunished
increases the risk of a negative effect, of promoting aggressive attitudes and behaviors. So you can
see, then, that the presentation of punishments
within scenes has big implications for risk for
child viewers.
One of my final points here involves the implications of these findings for the V-chip. The Vchip is a system that is designed to label programs.
It's not inherently meant to provide a value judgment, although it may be evolving that way because of the implementation decisions made by
the television industry. It certainly could be a descriptive system. It could be content-descriptive
rather than age-based prescriptive as the industry
has chosen to apply it.
If a content-descriptive approach was ever to be
pursued, the findings that we've got here in terms
of the measures for scenes and interactions would
provide an excellent foundation for identifying
and labeling the risks associated with different
types of portrayals of violence. You probably can't
do that in the current age-based system because it
is too simple and basic and doesn't really indicate
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any consideration of content at all. The current
system doesn't have the capability of levels for
describing different types of content, such as a V
1-5. And so I don't think it's possible to apply the
richness of the measures from the NTVS research
to a system that is so rudimentary as the industry's
initial V-chip rating plan. Should that plan, however, be replaced or supplemented by a more content descriptive system, this study would have
much to contribute to the categorization of violence based on its risk of harm to the child audience.
CatherineJ. Ross:
I've been asked to reflect on the historical and
cultural context for the current debate. I take a
different view of history than Dale because I have
been a professional historian as well as a law professor. Because time is so short, I'll risk some loss
of nuance in expressing three very simple ideas.
First, societal anxieties that associate young people with disorder, violence and sexuality have a
long historical lineage - even though our concepts of childhood have changed over time. Second, each new form of entertainment to emerge,
from dime novels to nickelodeons and pin ball
machines, from silent movies to TV, radio and Internet has often been targeted as a cause of youthful disorder and immoral conduct. Third, there is
a larger premise that may be so fundamental that
it gets lost in the current debate over children and
media: law and regulation are imbedded with social norms masquerading as either scientific findings or analytically derived legal certainties. The
endurance of societal anxieties about the moral
dangers facing youth lies at the core of the current debate on regulating children's entertainment. These fears are so resonant that they offer
a temptation to overlook fundamental First
Amendment and other liberty interests, including
a risk of redistributing the power to control children's access to materials from parents to the regulatory state.
As to the first point, a psychiatrist who works
with juveniles in Manhattan's Children's Court
described the "shock 'of meeting youngsters
under the age of sixteen who rob at the point of a
gun, push dope, rape and kill

... boys of seven,

so small they could barely clear the desk who had
sold themselves to sex perverts; others had shot
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out kids' eyes, or had clubbed or knifed them, just
for the fun of it."' It would be tempting to draw
on a wealth of social science literature to attribute
these tragedies, at least in part, to exposure to violence and sex on television. But, despite the
temptation of clean explanations, the author
wrote in 1954. And with all due respect to the
Senate Committee that Dale mentioned, in 1954
very few American families even owned televisions
and the nature of shows was considerably different than it is today. Indeed, this psychiatrist's
comments, with many more gruesome details, appeared in the Saturday Evening Post, a publication
aimed at Norman Rockwell's America which arrived in my own home weekly and was considered
ideal reading for the whole family. The idea that
there is trouble in River City and that is attributable to idleness, lack of adult supervision and the
temptations of the imagination is hardly new.
But before I compare some of the concerns being voiced about modern media with former efforts to shield children from potentially harmful
cultural influences, let me say a few words about
the social construction of childhood itself. The
underlying premise of children's moral vulnerability that has informed the three themes I outlined earlier is based on a relatively recent view of
childhood as a period of exceptional vulnerability
and innocence. Historians have noted the integration of the worlds of child and adult as late the
16th century. Adults and children played the
same games and joked about the same things, including sex and sexuality - material that would
not be allowed in school libraries or the broadcast
media during the -safe harbor" today. For example, the diary of the physician to the royal family
of France reveals coarse and indecent joking with
the Dauphin as a young child. When Louis XIII
was a small boy, the diary reports, and I quote, "in
high spirits he made everybody kiss his cock."
Before our modern phase of western culture, people didn't worry so much about exposing children
to death, violence or sexuality. Bear in mind that
public executions were a leading form of popular
entertainment to which families brought their
children. Only after people began thinking of
children as innocents who had to be protected
did it occur to them, for example, that children
should have their own separate reading matter or
that certain artistic classics should be expurgated
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or Bowdlerized (in honor of Mr. Bowdler) especially for children.
In western bourgeois society, then, a new view
of children emerged and that change placed children at the center of recurring debates on public
regulation of entertainment and morality. In the
late 19th century, educators and social reformers
emphasized the importance of teaching children
the puritan virtues, including self denial. And
they self-consciously proclaimed the need to prolong innocence as long as possible. Today, most
observers attribute numerous vulnerabilities to
children, including inexperience, lack of education, lack ofjudgment and mature intelligence or,
to frame it more negatively, naivet6, foolishness
and irresponsibility. Adults, including those involved in making law, normally assume that the
"different" way children look at the world is a "defective" way which they will outgrow.
These disturbing attributes, of childhood were
summarized by the Supreme Court (Rider 27)
throughout Bellotti "peculiar vulnerability of children; [and] their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner . . ." The

modern Western construction of childhood is
thus ensconced in law and commonly supports
the view that to the extent that children have any
protected liberty interests under the Constitution,
those interests may be constrained by the state in
ways that would not survive constitutional scrutiny
if applied to adults. Here, of course, lies the heart
of the controversy on which we focus today, for
the Bellotti Court also acknowledged "the importance of the parental role in child rearing" (Rider
27A) How far should the government go in putting teeth into the frequently cited dicta that "it is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hinder."
From a very early point in our jurisprudence,
the primacy of the parental role was subject to parameters that were defined by social norms.
These norms were enforced by moral gatekeepers
and related constituencies that turned to the state
and to law to enforce a vision of morality that included limitations on the external influences to
which young people could be exposed. If any one
person sums up the movement for state regula-
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tion of entertainment to protect children, it is
Anthony Comstock. Perhaps some of you recognize his name from Justice Douglas' dissent in
Ginsburg vs. New York where the court upheld a
special standard of obscenity for minors, as Chris
mentioned earlier. Justice Douglas reminded us
that Comstock waged war against obscenity from
1872 until he died in 1915, primarily as a United
States Postal Inspector who was licensed to seize
and destroy offensive materials under the provisions of a federal anti-obscenity act, adopted by
Congress in 1873 largely due to lobbying by Comstock and his allies. (Rider 28)
Moral crusaders demanded that the state protect children from a seemingly endless variety of
cultural dangers including: dime novels and serialized tales; story papers; books plays and paintings, including the classics, that might "arouse in
young and inexperienced minds lewd and libidinous thoughts"; literature on contraception; illustrated newspapers depicting vile crimes that really
happened; stage plays of "beastly character"; confectionery stores which sell prize chewing gum or
run candy lotteries; and observing adults drinking
alcohol or gambling. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children proclaimed that many
a girl was ruined at the ice skating rink. Residents
of small towns bemoaned the groups of boys who
hung around confectioneries and train stations
while their urban counterparts began to worry
about the moral impact of movie theaters and
automobiles. In crude anticipation of social science studies appearing today, late 19th century reformers began to count the instances of violence
in novels. In one novel alone they lamented the
hero gets into, among other things, five plain
fights, seven fights with four or more men, is shot
or attacked with knives twelve times and hurls
twenty-one men through the air. Many progressive reformers attributed all forms of adolescent
acting out to such cultural influences. Such acting out culminated in the juvenile crime witnessed in the newly formed juvenile courts. They
insisted that the government ban these forms of
amusement because too many parents were simply unaware of the noxious material their youngsters had hidden in their book bags. It's worth
noting that such efforts flourished during a period of enormous social turmoil fueled by, among
other things, unprecedented rates of immigration
by a new type of immigrant who brought different
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looks, culture, and language to our shores. It was
also a time of teaming slum life in growing urban
centers and a sense that our society consisted of
"us" and "them" to an unprecedented extent.
And this brings us to my third point: the relationship between social construction and social
reality in the current debate. The contemporary
anxiety about the nexus between child development and popular culture, whether it's rock lyrics,
TV or the Internet, is sometimes couched in the
secular language of the social sciences and sometimes in overt religious concern about morality.
But in each instance, the underlying concern invests a great deal in an image of childhood that
does not always conform to social realities. For
example, proponents of the Communications Decency Act argue that it merely helps parents regulate their own children's viewing. It's possible
that mandating provision of equipment to enable
parents to block categories of shows more efficiently may withstand constitutional scrutiny. The
problems lies, of course, in the rating system itself. Poll data indicates that parents want the kind
of information Dale was talking about that would
help them make choices informed by their own
values and by the particular child whose viewing
they are supervising. But this is not what the industry rating system proposes. The President has
already declared that if parents remain dissatisfied
with the ratings developed by the industry, he'll
call industry leaders back in and start from
scratch. This is a pretty diaphanous screen between government and industry code making.
Edythe Wise has written a very interesting history
of the FCC's efforts to stem indecency, in which
she explains that the concept of indecency has developed case-by-case, from an amorphous generalization poorly differentiated from obscenity into a
concept intimately connected with the exposure
of children to inappropriate material. In short, as
various broader approaches failed to satisfy the
courts, the Commission came to understand that
the proclaimed goal of protecting children provided the biggest fig leaf - and to be sure there
may be something underneath the fig leaf that
most of us do not want our own children to see.
This use of children as a government shield
from the First Amendment has largely worked until this past term in Denver Area. But as Justice
Kennedy pointed out in a separate opinion in that
case, the combination of new technology and the
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weighty interest of the government in protecting
children allowed the plurality in that case to
evade any clear legal standard. Jack Balkin has addressed all of the ways in which ratings can promote self-censorship, and the ways in which ratings can force producers to flirt with getting to
the edge of the line in an article in the Duke Law
Journal. Ratings can also backfire. The subjects
of regulation easily subvert it. My own ten-yearold begins with the presumption that a film with a
PG rating should not be seen by a boy as sophisticated as he is. I can't get him to go see those movies.
The debate over children in television tends to
remove kids from their concrete world, whether
that world is upper middle class suburbia or inner
city poverty. The violence that children witness in
their own families and their daily lives must surely
be as significant to their development as what they
see on TV. Yet as a society, we tolerate a level of
violence in the inner city, where some children
witness gun fire every single day on their way to
school, that if fictionalized and broadcast would
be deemed entirely unsuitable. As the local debates over school curricula in libraries over the
last decade make clear, organized interest groups
prove very powerful in leading to compromise of
fundamental First Amendment interests. Government agencies that of necessity choose among various speakers, as schools and librarians do, have
not demonstrated a convincing ability to withstand the pressure of such groups about what is
appropriate for children. The potential for both
formal and informal coercion is immense.
Similarly, our experience with the administration of vaguely worded child neglect laws underscores the dangers in recent moves to regulate
children's media under the guise of helping parents. Child neglect laws give enormous discretion
to agencies and courts with dangers of personal
interpretation and resulting disparate impact on
the poor and the rich, the non-conformist and
the conformist. To paraphrase the court in Cohen,
one parent's vulgarity may be another's lyric. Will
parental unwillingness or inability to use the rating and blocking systems present the same risk of
government intervention into families revealed in
cases about households deemed too dirty, too full
of animals, or simply too poor to provide an appropriate environment for children? When government gets involved in the effort to protect chil-
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dren from disturbing imagery, it endangers
essential legal, social, and family values that rest
solidly in First Amendment and other liberty interests. Extreme caution is warranted in using
children as an excuse to label and limit communication.
Jack Balkin:
I want to talk about three things today. First, I
want to talk further about some of the things that
Catherine Ross just raised concerning what I'm
going to call the problematization of children.
Second, I want to talk briefly about possible constitutional problems that the V-chip and the new
ratings system raise. Third, I want to talk a little
bit about problems with the V-chip that aren't really constitutional, but are nevertheless worrisome. They are the kinds of problems that arise
whenever you try to put any rating system into
practice; and they apply to Internet ratings systems as well as the V-chip.
I've just suggested that children are "problematized." What does this mean? Well, I simply mean
that at certain points in history, certain kinds of
questions become a central focus of concern; they
become the lens through which all sorts of other
issues are imagined and discussed. "Problematization" means that something becomes increasingly
thought of as a problem, a recurrent object for
analysis, discussion, worry, and concern through
which many other things will be understood, categorized and addressed. When something becomes problematized, people tend to focus on it;
indeed, they may tend to focus on it obsessively.
This is not to say that what gets problematized
isn't something important or something people
always worry about to some degree, and rightly so.
That's probably one of the reasons it got
problematized in the first place. After all, people
love their children and have always been concerned about their welfare. But I'm concerned
here with the notion that people focus obsessively
on children as a recurrent trope for understanding society or as the master story for discussing
and solving social problems. It becomes a sort of
all-purpose way of formulating issues.
What explains this problematization of children? Catherine has pointed out that this is not
the first time it's happened. Behind this phenomenon is an important concern: How can we or
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should we regulate culture given our commitment
to free speech? We want to shape and control the
development of our culture, and we also want to
protect free speech, but these desires clash with
each other. Hence the turn to children as the
master trope, the perspective through which we
can talk about cultural control, while at the same
time professing our respect for freedom of
speech. Because children have fewer first amendment rights than adults, because children need to
be protected, shaped, educated, and so on, and
because children are the future of our culture, we
can reconcile our conflicting desires by viewing all
cultural issues in terms of children and their interests and needs.
This approach has advocates both on the left
and on the right. The right wants to ban smut.
However the communitarian left is very interested
in stamping out misogyny and racism, and promoting civic virtue.
Problematization often comes complete with
paradigm cases of concern. When the Computer
Decency Act was being debated in Congress there
was a Time Magazine cover featuring a cherubic
looking six-year-old. His face is illuminated by the
light of a computer monitor in front of him. His
eyes are wide open in surprise - he'sjust stumbled
upon some horrible thing on the Internet. The
magazine doesn't show us what he's watching, but
you just know from his expression that it must be
something quite terrible. That's the paradigmatic
image that Congressmen and other politicians
have been promoting. In fact, however, people
are really worried not about six-year-olds who accidentally stumble upon naughty Web sites, but
teenagers - sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds who are actively looking for these sites. These
teenagers are much more technologically sophisticated than their parents, and as a result, these
teenagers are getting remarkably and dangerously
close to being beyond the control of anyone.
Well, they are probably already beyond the control of anyone [laughter from audience].
As a result of these concerns - and this is related to Chris Wright's remarks - we are witnessing a movement from Red Lion to Pacifica as the
governing theory of content-based regulation of
mass media. These two cases have very different
effects. Red Lion is based on the rationale of scarcity; Pacifica is based nominally on something
called "pervasiveness." But really it's a protection
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of children rationale, although it's unclear
whether the rationale is the protection of parental
control over children or the protection of children regardless of what their parents want.
The move from Red Lion to Pacifica is a move
from a concern with what must be on television to
a concern with what must not be. The scarcity rationale is a much better justification for talking
about what you have to put on. It's much less
good as a justification of what should be kept off,
unless you are going to dictate virtually the whole
of the programming day on the grounds of scarcity.
Children's programming - for example a requirement that networks commit to three hours a
week of "high-quality" programming designed for
children - makes much more sense in terms of
the older Red Lion vision than in terms of Pacifica,
which mixes issues of parental control, harm to
children and privacy.
Nevertheless, Pacifica is becoming, I think, the
key case that people will focus on in attempts to
regulate both sex and violence. Why is this happening? To begin with, we must recognize that
there is a very genuine cultural anxiety in this
country. Such anxieties come in waves, produced
by many different factors. We are now in the middle of a large scale change in the nature of our
society, our mores and our economy. These
changes produce lots of anxiety about what is happening and what the future holds. In such moments people try to cling to the world that they
see slipping away from them. And they become
like the drunk that searches for the keys near the
lamp post because the light is better there. They
focus on the mass media as the most obvious symbol of what's happening and what's going wrong
with the world. People are tempted to think that
control of the mass media might in some way
counteract or ameliorate the many changes they
see occurring around them. To be sure, the mass
media probably are having some effect on social
transformation, but it's likely that many other social and economic phenomena are also contributing to changes in our values and our situation.
Finally, although people are worried about
these trends - including changing mores, economic dislocation, changes in the composition
and structure of the family, and so on - they feel
they can't really change them. Or at least they
can't really change them without spending a
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whole lot of money, whereas regulating the mass
media is what we might call an unfunded mandate [laughter from audience] as defenders of
federalism call it.
We should not underestimate the genuine cultural anxiety and the genuine concern that parents feel about changes in family relationships in
the last quarter of this century. There are many
more single-parent households. In more and
more cases where a child lives with two parents,
both parents work. Those parents get to spend
less time with their children. And parents feel
more and more that they don't have any say in
educating their children or in shaping what their
children learn and assimilate. For many families
the television is becoming the ad hoc baby-sitter.
We should also consider the role of accelerating technological development in producing cultural anxiety. One of the most interesting features of the technological revolution we're
currently undergoing is that it creates an increasing skills gap between parents and their children.
Parents look at their six-year-old children with
amazement - they can already install software, log
on to the Internet, crack Defense Department security codes. The parents, on the other hand, sit
helplessly in front of VCRs that are blinking "1212-12-12." This emerging technology gap is related to Catherine's story about the changing historical conceptions of the relationships between
parents and children. In an important sense it
represents something new: an accelerating technological divide in which parents see themselves
increasingly baffled by the new technology, while
they see their own children increasingly comfortable with it. They ask themselves: "What are these
kids doing with this stuff that I can't operate and
can't even understand?" That fear of an increasing technological gap between the generations
shapes attitudes that parents have about their children; it underlies parental concerns about the Internet as well as television programming.
Behind the slogan of "protecting our children"
are three different possible concerns. One is a
concern about harm to children, another is the
desire to make children better citizens, and the
third - which I think is really at the heart of the
current cultural anxieties - is the desire to promote parental control over children.
These three concerns are quite distinct from
each other and may even be in conflict. For ex-
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ample, we assume that most parents love their
children and want the best for them. Yet we usually do not sanction parents who make programming choices we would not make. Parents are
perfectly free to bring R-rated movies home and
leave them lying around, even though their children could put them in the VCR and watch them.
Parents can also leave magazines and books with
adult or violent themes within reach of children.
If the state criminally punished parents for doing
this, or brought them up on charges of child
abuse, I think most parents would strongly object
to this, including parents who are the most fervent supporters of better and cleaner TV.
My point is that most parents don't want the
government to sanction them for exposing their
children to what the government thinks is harmful. What they want is to have more control over
what their children are watching. This concern
about parental control is not the same thing as a
concern with protecting children from a state-enforced conception of harm. Different people may
have different views about what is harmful to children. Some parents may not want their children
exposed to evolutionary theory, others want them
kept away from discussions of homosexuality, still
others may want to shield them from reactionary
views about gender or race, still others from violent depictions of war, endless steams of commercials, and so on.
A similar logic applies to the goal of fostering
better citizens. What government policy makers
think will foster better citizens may well conflict
with parents' views about what is harmful to their
children and may interfere with parental control.
Some parents don't want their children to be exposed to PBS - the great Satan of secular humanism. They may want to keep their children away
from the kinds of things that others think will
make them better citizens.
To be sure, one argument for regulation of television is precisely that "other people" will not
control their children in the way you think best.
These "other people" will leave their children in
front of the television all day long, the children
will absorb all of this violent and misogynist programming, and then they will go onto the playground and beat the stuffing out of your kids.
This fear is related to the familiar claim that education is a public good: educating children and
making them into responsible adults has positive
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benefits for others who will have to deal with
them in the future. Conversely, lack of education
or bad education is a public harm; it imposes negative external costs on others. Perhaps this may
be behind some of the calls for regulation of television. People may be thinking to themselves:
"We've got to regulate what children watch because their shiftless, lazy, no-good parents won't
do it, and as a result their kids will beat up our
kids or be bad citizens and burdens on society."
There are all sorts of elitist and class issues lurking
beneath the surface here. But my larger point is
that when the matter is put this way you can see
that the conflict between protecting children
from harm (as defined by elites or government officials) and parental control is pretty starkly
posed.
This is the flip side of what Catherine was talking about earlier: she noted that an important
question is whether government bureaucracy is
going to take over the parental role. The movement for regulation of television programming
may stem from a desire for parental control but it
often ends up becoming a bureaucratic regime
that ironically undercuts parental control.
Now let me talk a little about some of the constitutional issues surrounding the new television
ratings system and the V-chip. By now you've
probably noticed that little icons like "PG-TV" are
popping up at the beginning of each program.
The networks and some cable programmers have
started implementing the Valenti Commission's
ratings system, which is based on the MPAA movie
ratings system.
By law the industry was required to put a ratings
system in place by the beginning of 1997, subject
to what I call the "fail-safe" provisions of the 1996
Communications Act: if the industry didn't put
anything in place, then the FCC would appoint a
bunch of experts to come up with something. In
fact, the fail-safe provisions do more that this: if
the FCC doesn't like what the industry comes up
with, it can reject it and appoint a panel to devise
an alternative ratings system.
Here's where the constitutional issues come in.
Meese vs. Keene aside (I'll come back to it in a second), there's a serious constitutional problem
with imposing a particular rating system and requiring that the broadcasters use it in their programming. The V-chip legislation is actually cleverly written to avoid this constitutional difficulty.
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It only says that if you already have a rating system, you must encode it for the V-chip that we're
going to require be put in all television sets.
What's left open is whether or not the FCC has
the authority or the power to require that its own
rating system be used by broadcasters and put
into TV broadcasts.
That second question is constitutionally much
more dicey. With all due respect to Chris, I don't
think Meese vs. Keene will get you there. After all,
Meese involved the application of a statute to a person who was not actually bound by its requirements; he simply objected to the government's labeling of a film on acid rain as "propaganda." But
normally the government is free to engage in its
own speech, including creating a system of classifications. Surely one can't object to the Library of
Congress cataloguing system because the government has created it and uses it in its own libraries.
But if the government required all libraries
(whether public or private) to classify their books
according to that system, there might be a problem.
Moreover, the V-chip ratings system is more
than simply a neutral apolitical classification system, it's more than simply a question of labeling.
It sends a whole bunch of other messages as well,
some of which I'll discuss in a moment.
In any case, I don't think that the FCC really
has to impose its own system on the broadcast industry. And I doubt that it really wants to.
Rather, what the FCC may want to do is simply use
its persuasive power to jawbone the industry to
come up with something it likes a little better
without actually threatening that it will scrap the
whole system and put its own system in place.
There are lots of ways the FCC can do this. So the
FCC doesn't have to mandate anything, and I suspect that's probably how they will proceed if it
finds the Valenti proposals sufficiently unsatisfactory. It's not an either-or situation: either the Valenti proposal or an entirely new system. Of
course, in public Valenti apparently has been adamant: it's my way or the highway, he's said. But
again, this strikes me as being the opening bargaining position rather than the final result.
Chris might know more about that than I would.
Now I'd like to discuss a slightly different set of
issues concerning ratings systems. The present
ratings system is aged-based. Dale Kunkel has
pointed out the benefits of an informational sys-
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tem that is content-based rather than age-based,
because it is more useful to parents. I think this
choice is importantly related to whether the Vchip is justified on grounds of parental control or
harm to children. If you think it's about parental
control, then obviously, you want to foster choice;
but if its about harm to children, you might actually want to reduce the options parents have.
With a system like the proposed Canadian one with three content categories each rated from 1 to
5 - parents have much more opportunity to fine
tune what they want their children to see. On the
surface, at least, it seems to offer them much
more control. But this is not completely the case
because we have yet to discuss what is in those
content-based categories. And there is a further
problem, which I'm sure that Valenti and his associates were worried about.
The more categories you create, the more difficult it is to create a simple and efficient blocking
mechanism. That's really what the V-chip is - a
blocking mechanism. The goal is to create a
blocking mechanism that is simple enough to be
used by technological idiots, but that is also effective enough to keep away people who are much
more technologically sophisticated - that is, children. This not a problem of constitutional law
but of technological design. The dead-bolt lock is
a good example of a simple and effective blocking
mechanism. It is easy to operate. Even an ordinary 35-year-old parent can operate it. On the
other hand, the dead-bolt lock is often very effective at keeping certain kinds of people out. So
what the V-chip system really needs is something
technologically equivalent to the dead-bolt lock.
Nevertheless, you face problems of how you're going to design it, how many categories there will
be, and so on. And then there are problems that
inhere in any ratings system. Let me mention a
few of those right now.
Any rating system, whether it's designed by jack
Valenti, or whether it's designed by Dale Kunkel,
or whether it's designed by your favorite media
maven, has two problems. One is the problem of
coarseness, and the other is the problem of
equivalency. By coarseness I mean the number of
possible categories you use - the number of possible boxes to put things in. The fewer categories
you have, the coarser the ratings become, and the
less flexibility you have in designing it. On the
other hand, the more categories you have, the
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more difficult the system is to implement. So
there is usually a tradeoff between coarseness and
ease of use.
If coarseness is the question of how many categories or boxes there are, equivalency is the question of what gets counted as in the same category,
or put in the same box. Equivalency is not the
same as coarseness: Imagine a system in which you
have only two settings - call them "sacred" and
"profane." (The V-chip sort of reminds me of
these anthropologist's categories). In one ratings
system, homosexual conduct is considered -profane,", and in the other system, it's in the "sacred." Everything else is kept the same. Note that
these two ratings systems are equally coarse, but
they make very different things equivalent. In the
second system, homosexual conduct and Walt Disney specials are in the same box, and in the first
system, homosexual conduct and slasher films are
categorized the same. The two systems are
equally coarse, but the point is that what each system calls equivalent, makes equivalent, is different
in each.
Coarseness is a problem for parental control because it undermines your ability to fine tune what
your kids watch. But the problem of equivalency
is, I think, even more problematic from the standpoint of parental control - and from the standpoint of having informed parents. The organizations who rate programs get to decide what gets
rated as equivalent to what. Take a horror film
where a woman is slashed by some nut in a hockey
mask who terrorizes women and then laughs
about it. Now take a film in which two men fall in
love and are kissing. Are these equivalent or not?
It depends on the ratings system we use.
Take two men kissing and a man and a woman
having sex. If you say they are both examples of
sexual content, will one be rated 5 and the other
4, or will they both rated in the 4 category? Or
consider dirty words. Consider the example of
sex - the F word - and racism - the N word.

Which gets rated higher, the F word or the N
word? Or is the F word equivalent to the N word?
In one version of the Canadian ratings system I
believe that the F word was rated as worse than
the N word. But it doesn't matter - either way,
there's going to be a politics involved in the
choice.
Thus, even though what we would ideally like is
a sort of value-free social-scientific vision that is
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merely descriptive, and simply empowers parental
choice, unfortunately, that's not what we're going
to get in practice. What were going to get in practice are decisions about what's equivalent to what.
These decisions are going to be written into the
code of the V-chip system, and they are going to
be used to block out things. And this system of
equivalencies is going to have significant political
effects. This is unavoidable even if it is not desirable.
Rating homosexuality is one example where
these effects will be quite important. Societal attitudes about homosexuality are changing. They
have been changing over a period of time, but the
change is accelerating. This is a difficult and
problematic time to be deciding what will be considered to be equivalent to what. It is likely - here
I am just being pessimistic - that scenes that make
fun of gay people will be treated as much more
appropriate for children then any genuine expression of affection between homosexuals. The
latter situations will probably be considered appropriate only for more mature audiences. And
this choice does have a definite political spin. It
will probably be defended on the grounds that
broadcasters don't want to be controversial. But
what's implicit in that choice is that making fun of
gay people is not controversial. On the other
hand, showing gay people kissing or as being ordinary people who have loving relationships with
each other will be seen as a very controversial idea
that will involve a high level of sexual content in
the ratings. Of course you could design a rating
system in which both heterosexual and homosexual expressions of affection are considered
equivalent sexual content. You could devise a rating system in which homosexual affection is seen
as just as normal as heterosexual affection. But I
doubt anyone will understand that choice as
nonpolitical and value neutral.
These are some of the problems that face us in
trying to put a viable V-chip system in place. The
problem with the Valenti proposal - and I think
this relates to Dale's concerns - is that it basically
sweeps all of these issues of coarseness and
equivalency under the rug by basically hiding
everything under age-related categories, so that
you don't really know what is being made
equivalent to what. Because you don't know, you
are less likely to complain. That's a good thing
from the standpoint of the industry, because if
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people actually did know what was being made
equivalent to what in these age-related categories,
different groups would complain very loudly on
many different fronts, making varied and possibly
inconsistent demands. But the jury is still out on
whether it's a good thing from the standpoint of
the public.
Lili Levi:
Thank you very much to all the panelists. We
have heard many interesting things. Let me take
a moment as moderator to comment on some of
them. The argument for the "need" for child-protective regulation appears to rest on two sorts of
assumptions: one, that the electronic medium is a
powerful source of social effects, and the other,
that parents can not control their children's listening and viewing, especially now that television
is the national nanny.
We have heard that this focus on reforming the
media to protect children at first might look
somewhat ironic because, outside the mass media
context, the notion of the protection of children
is often honored in the breach. Even though we
pay lip service to notions about the welfare of children, we also pass the current welfare legislation
despite its predictable effects on the well-being of
children. Perhaps, in reassessing our initial reaction, we might conclude that the public discussion
of television lately rests on a developing image of
the medium - a re-imagining of television as some
sort of adjunct to the public education system.
What is the administrative vision that animates
(or at least accompanies) that kind of approach?
One possibility that we have heard today is something of a "quid pro quo" rationale: that if we are
not going to allocate broadcast spectrum by an
auction model, then regulation should be justified as a quid pro quo for the assignment of public
property to broadcasters. Note that this rationale
is not limited to the protection of children (even
if child welfare notions can justify the particular
quid pro quo exacted). Catherine might say that
this would justify really rather extensive and potentially quite intrusive regulatory oversight, at
least with regard to certain sorts of things that the
Chairman and others at the Commission have
characterized as predictable areas of market failure.
Another possibility - based on a literal reading
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of some of the public statements and writings of
Chairman Hundt - is that the animating administrative vision at the FCC today is a civic republican
notion. This language, too, is susceptible to an interventionist regulatory interpretation.
But if we look closely at what the FCC has been
doing we might conclude that neither a fullfledged quid pro quo rationale nor a civic republican framework is really what's going on. We
might say that the FCC's approach appears to be
the adoption of a kind of middle way between
some notion of really intrusive, full-fledged governmental regulation on the one hand and completely laissez-faire private ordering on the other
hand.
How is that middle way going to be interpreted?
It seems to have two aspects. In some contexts,
the middle position is some direct regulation of
content - such as the children's educational programming requirement. Yet this direct regulation
purports to be, and is advertised as, relatively
targeted and narrow. In other contexts, the middle position is a kind of regulation that is facilitative of private choices. By such facilitative regulation, I mean to refer to information designed to
further private ordering - such as V-chip ratings
and other information-labeling approaches
designed to enable parents to make the appropriate kinds of decisions about what their kids
should watch.
The FCC would presumably say that neither
one of these middle position approaches should
be particularly disturbing. We are predisposed to
think of affirmative regulations as particularly
problematic because of the government's direct
weighing in. Yet, with regard to its current content regulation, the Commission can point to the
fact that the direct regulation now in place is awfully proceduralist, clearly viewpoint neutral and,
at least at an abstract level, content neutral as well.
With regard to children's educational television,
for example, the FCC would argue that the
agency's intervention is nothing more than
micromanagement at the procedural level, with
no substantive definition clearly set by the Commission about what counts as children's educational programming.
We are also not supposed to worry about the
facilitative regulatory possibilities because they are
by definition designed to be non-coercive. Supporters say that they simply require the provision
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of information. This is like food labeling. In fact,
the more detailed, concrete, contextual and empirically-based the labeling, the more intelligent
the likely parental decisionmaking. Some might
even say that such detailed calls for content are
less worrisome from the point of view of promoting a monolithic politics because the effect of providing information is simply to enable all parents
- regardless of their different political views on
the spectrum - to make informed choices for
their kids.
So why should we worry about an administrative
model that seems to be not terribly intrusive in
terms of direct content regulation, is based on the
unexceptionable goal of protecting children, rests
on a quidpro quo argument that is not entirely irrational, and only facilitates intelligent decisionmaking by parents pursuant to an FTC approach?
First, the problem of direct content regulation
as envisioned by this FCC. If the content regulation is going to be so targeted, quantified, narrow
and "neutral" - as part of a quid pro quo, contractarian approach - we can interpret that in two
ways. On the one hand, we can warn that these
interventions presage an immense exercise of governmental power without great gains. By contrast,
we could bemoan the adoption of the current,
anemic public interest obligations requirements
in lieu of any possibility of real and effective regulation, arguing that the public is not really getting
very much for what the Commission has thus far
foregone. Or maybe what we are getting is just a
kind of shrinking of the FCC.
On the indirect or facilitative model, we have
heard that there are subtle but significant dangers
that such regulations can serve as the occasion for
the infiltration of government-imposed or approved values and political views. Dale admits
that the empirical data on television's effects on
children needs to be and will be deployed
through a value filter. He also proposes that
there is social consensus, at least as to violence, in
regard to the value filter. By contrast, Jack asks
about what we do - say particularly in the sexual
expression context - with regard to issues where
consensus has not yet developed, or where we can
begin to discern a shift. Will whatever ratings system we select be grounded on and contain the vision of a governmentally-approved ideal family or
an ideal child? Is that vision the image of the middle class child with the middle class parent watch-
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ing television together and discussing the child's
reaction to a program's anti-violence message? If
so, that result is clearly political, suggests Jack. Is
it good or not?
While Catherine's account of the cyclical history of child-protective regulation of expression is
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somewhat reassuring, none of the solutions thus
far has fully addressed the problem. We are still
at the beginning of the discussion - regulatorily,
in terms of the development of legal doctrines,
and in terms of cultural affects. Thank you.
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APPENDIX I

Overall Industry Averages: Year 1 vs. Year 2 Comparisons
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